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Tackling 
the Global 
NCD Crisis: 
Innovations 
in Law and 
Governance
Bryan Thomas and  
Lawrence O. Gostin
To someone holding a hammer, the cliché goes, everything looks like a nail. A similar myopia often afflicts legal minds as they approach 
deep-seated problems in global health, as every crisis 
is approached by first asking how it might be litigated 
away. In recent years, there has been a growing recog-
nition of the limits of litigation as a tool for advancing 
equitable access to health — indeed of its potential, 
under some circumstances, to have a positively regres-
sive impact.1 This very timely symposium offers us a 
chance to reflect more deeply on the matter. 
Our aim in this paper is to draw the lens back from a 
narrow focus on litigation, to survey the broader land-
scape of global health law and governance. Many of 
the most pressing health challenges facing the world 
today are intertwined with the complex dynamics of 
globalization, and require policy solutions that see 
national and international institutions acting in con-
cert, collaborating with the private sector and civil 
society. The most glaring and urgent case in point — 
which will serve as the focal point of our discussion 
— concerns the precipitous rise of non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) worldwide. 
Four NCDs — cardiovascular disease, cancer, respi-
ratory disease and diabetes — account for 63% of 
global deaths annually. The conventional wisdom, 
which conceives of NCDs as a ‘First World’ problem, 
is starkly belied by current data: of the 35 million peo-
ple who die annually of NCDs, 80% are in low- and 
middle-income countries. The death toll is projected 
to rise by 17% over the next decade, unless meaning-
ful steps are taken immediately. Recent meta-analysis 
of available data shows a quintupling of diabetes in 
rural areas of developing and middle-income coun-
tries.2 With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, NCD 
mortality now “exceeds that of communicable, mater-
nal, perinatal, and nutritional conditions combined.”3 
Conventional wisdom errs as well in supposing that 
rising NCD rates are simply the byproduct of an aging 
population: more than 50% of its global burden strikes 
those under the age of 70. 
Beyond the immediate suffering and death repre-
sented by these numbers, NCDs take a toll on develop-
ment, in rising health care costs and lost productivity. 
An authoritative study has estimated that the cumu-
lative costs of NCDs will be at least $47 trillion from 
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2010 through 2030, with mental illnesses accounting 
for more than one-third of the cost. This is a low-end 
estimate. Other economic models calculate the costs 
at far higher levels still.4 These costs manifest them-
selves in downward spirals of poverty, for individuals 
and families, as NCD sufferers find themselves unable 
to work, and faced with ruinous medical expenses. 
The moral tragedy lies in the fact that this is largely 
preventable. The primary risk factors for NCDs are well 
known, and could be reduced or eliminated, given the 
political and social will — through aggressive tobacco 
control, reduced air pollution, healthier diets, increased 
physical activity, and reduced alcohol consumption. 
Together, these variables account for 80% of heart dis-
ease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes, and 40% of cancers.5 
A problem as complex and consequential as NCDs 
requires engagement of national governments, the 
international community, and an “all-of-society” 
approach encompassing all key actors. Below we dis-
cuss innovative governance strategies at the national 
and international levels for addressing the problem 
of NCDs, spanning across various sectors (e.g., trade, 
agriculture, transportation, and the environment) and 
engaging diverse stakeholders (e.g., multilateral orga-
nizations, states, civil society, philanthropic groups, and 
industry). But before setting out in search of solutions, 
it is worth trying to understand the failings to date.
1. The Quiet Growth of an Epidemic
The past half-century has seen momentous accom-
plishments in global health: the triumph of polio 
vaccination, the eradication of smallpox, and unan-
ticipated successes in containing the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic. On the face of it, the challenge of NCDs would 
appear comparatively manageable — as indicated, the 
risk factors are well understood, and there are prom-
ising strategies available to mitigate them. Why then 
has the problem been allowed to spiral out of control?
Challenges in Social Mobilization around NCDs
A key factor has been the lack of social mobilization, 
to date, pressing for urgent action. Though particu-
lar NCDs have heightened prevalence among specific 
groups, there is no cohesive, self-identifying group lob-
bying for action on all NCDs. Looking back at social 
mobilization against Big Tobacco, for example, one 
finds that the movement was driven by a core group 
of ardent volunteers — often relatives of the victims of 
tobacco-related illness. Political momentum around 
HIV/AIDS followed a similar dynamic. Rather than 
unify around a comprehensive strategy on 
NCDs, social movements have often splin-
tered, raising consciousness about particu-
lar diseases.
The multifactorial causation of NCDs 
poses further challenges — not only for 
medicine and health policy, but also for 
social mobilization. As explained below, 
reducing the burden of NCDs will involve 
experimentation with various comple-
mentary strategies, across multiple sec-
tors. Whereas HIV/AIDS activists can rally around 
demands for access to anti-retroviral medicines, the 
policy demands of the anti-NCD movement will not 
fit neatly on a placard. 
One might hope that litigation would serve as a 
catalyst for faltering social movements. Such was the 
case, for example, with the anti-tobacco movement in 
the U.S., as litigation led to the disclosure of damning 
industry documents, prompting public outrage and 
swift government action. A similar trajectory seems 
unlikely in the case of NCDs, in part because no single 
industry is to blame — the problems are manifold, as 
are the solutions. Typically, where NCDs give rise to 
litigation, claimants are seeking access to expensive 
medical therapies, such as cancer treatments. Rare are 
the cases where litigation is used to demand imple-
mentation of broad preventative strategies — though 
there have been encouraging developments around 
the issue of second-hand tobacco smoke.6 
Plainly, the focus in addressing NCDs must be largely 
on prevention, as opposed to pharmacomedical treat-
ment after the fact. But prevention strategies aimed 
at improved health for the next generation may lack 
the political urgency of treatment strategies that save 
identifiable lives today. Many of the strategies outlined 
below will pay out their dividends over decades. From 
the vantage point of today, the beneficiaries are largely 
statistical ‘people’ — e.g., the cohort of adults entering 
middle age, decades from now, experiencing reduced 
rates of adult-onset diabetes, thanks in part to public 
health interventions on diet and physical activity. 
Moreover, prevention strategies often have a whiff of 
paternalism, and this can be a distinct political liabil-
ity. New York City’s Mayor recently unveiled plans to 
limit the serving size of sugary soft dinks sold in movie 
theatres and convenience stores, immediately earning 
A problem as complex and consequential 
as NCDs requires engagement of 
national governments, the international 
community, and an “all-of-society” approach 
encompassing all key actors.
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himself the nickname ‘Nanny Bloomberg.’ Similarly, 
the anti-tobacco movement stalled for decades, as it 
was believed that the decision to smoke — by then 
known to be a life or death decision — was a matter 
of personal choice, not of public concern. It was only 
when the dangers of second-hand smoke came to light 
that the social movement gained momentum. 
We mention these concerns about paternalism 
only to signal the drag they may have on social move-
ments and, in turn, government action; in substance 
the concern is, quite frankly, often overblown. Like 
second-hand smoke, NCDs have an enormous impact 
on innocent third parties — among other things, by 
using up scarce health care resources, increasingly in 
developing countries still burdened with deadly com-
municable diseases (the so-called ‘double-burden’). 
Just as there is a valid public interest in assuring that 
citizens are educated and thereby able to contribute to 
the common good, so too there is a valid public inter-
est in the prevention of chronic maladies.
Moreover, the anti-paternalism objection rests on 
a perverse assumption — namely, that the status quo, 
with its rising NCD rates, is itself the product of indi-
vidual choices, freely made.7 The reality of course is 
that myriad collective decisions — made by govern-
ments and private interests — shape the menu of 
options available to individuals, determining the price 
and availability of nutritious foods, the accessibility of 
places to exercise, ways to commute to and from work, 
and so on. There is no avoiding government influ-
ence over risk behaviors. The question is only whether 
that influence will advance or detract from the abil-
ity to lead a healthy lifestyle. Calls for a laissez-faire 
approach are especially galling, given it is the poor 
who will bear the brunt of government inaction — as 
they may lack the financial means and leisure time 
needed to prepare healthy foods, exercise, have regu-
lar checkups, and so on. 
Misunderstanding among Key Decision Makers
The lack of social mobilization has allowed various 
myths about NCDs to go unchallenged in the halls of 
power worldwide. We mentioned some of these myths 
already: e.g., the view that NCDs affect only the elderly 
and the affluent; that they are the product of personal 
choice and therefore beyond the proper reach of gov-
ernment; and the fatalistic assumption that the prob-
lem is insolubly complex. 
Moreover, even when NCDs are recognized as a 
problem, they are often placed below infectious dis-
eases in decision makers’ list of priorities. At the level 
of global institutions, this is partly a reflection of his-
torical roles: the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and its institutional precursors in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, were primarily focused on the 
containment of infectious diseases. Having special-
ized in infectious diseases for decades, WHO has 
been reticent in pressing an expanded agenda on 
the broader determinants of health. If the aim is to 
promote long and healthy lives, WHO’s prioritiza-
tion is quite misguided, as there is a direct interplay 
between infectious diseases and NCDs. Many infec-
tious agents are known to cause cancer (e.g., HPV 
and cervical cancer); many of the risk factors for 
NCDs also exacerbate infectious diseases (e.g., smok-
ing increases the risk of death from tuberculosis); 
and infectious disease therapies increase the risk of 
NCDs (e.g., antiretroviral regimens can increase the 
risk of heart disease in HIV patients). A recent study 
found that 1 in 6 cancers worldwide are caused by 
treatable or preventable infections. Infection-related 
cancers are much more prevalent in the developing 
world than the developed (23% of cancers versus 7%, 
respectively) — owing to lack of vaccination and anti-
microbial treatments, etc.8 
Lastly, decision makers often assume that their pur-
suit of economic development will bring improved 
health as a byproduct. That assumption is tenuous in 
the case of NCDs, which may in fact be exacerbated by 
development, as urbanization leads to increased reli-
ance on cars, less green space for recreation, and rising 
incomes lead to increased consumption of tobacco, 
alcohol, and calorie laden foods. Globalization of trade 
and investment — a favored strategy for economic 
The lack of social mobilization has allowed various myths about NCDs  
to go unchallenged in the halls of power worldwide. We mentioned some  
of these myths already: e.g., the view that NCDs affect only the elderly and  
the affluent; that they are the product of personal choice and therefore 
beyond the proper reach of government; and the fatalistic assumption  
that the problem is insolubly complex. 
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development — facilitates the supply and marketing 
of unhealthy consumer goods. 
The situation is dire but not hopeless. Given the 
political will, there is much that national governments 
can do to stem the tide on NCDs. As we will explore 
in section 2, the options range from soft interventions 
such as improved food labeling to more direct forms 
of regulation (e.g., banning trans fats). Yet efforts 
to respond to this crisis are doomed to fail without 
international cooperation. Many of the risk factors 
associated with NCDs are, in a very real sense, com-
municable. They are communicated from wealthy 
nations to developing nations, facilitated by global 
trade agreements, through the marketing and export 
of cigarettes, alcohol, and unhealthy processed foods. 
Billions of people worldwide have seen their physical, 
cultural, and nutritional landscape drastically changed 
in recent decades, by forces of globalization that lie 
mostly beyond their control. In section 3, we explore 
how global governance strategies might respond as a 
force for health. 
Though we will focus largely on public institu-
tions, one must recognize the essential role of the 
private sector in the search for sustainable solutions 
to the NCD epidemic. While the anti-tobacco move-
ment rightly demands that Big Tobacco be denied 
any role in public health initiatives, the food indus-
try will need to be engaged, on an ongoing basis, 
in the battle against NCDs. This need for ongoing 
food industry engagement, as part of lasting solu-
tion, remains a daunting challenge: experience with 
tobacco suggests that entrenched industries will fight 
reforms tooth-and-nail. In section 4, we explore the 
promise and perils of multisectoral solutions to the 
NCD crisis. 
2. Domestic Strategies for Addressing NCDs
National governments — and their counterparts at 
the state and local level — will of necessity be the 
primary actors in the battle against NCDs, as they 
alone possess the sovereign authority to implement 
needed legal and regulatory measures. Indeed, under 
international human rights law, domestic govern-
ments are obligated to promote the highest attainable 
standard of health among their population, within 
the resources at their disposal. What does this obliga-
tion require, concretely, by way of action on NCDs? 
There is no one-size-fits-all governance solution, as 
interventions must be tailored to the particular needs 
of a population and optimized within resource con-
straints. In what follows, though, we survey some 
key interventions, ranging from simple surveillance 
of NCD rates to more direct, ‘command and control’ 
regulation.9 
Monitoring Rates of NCDs
While infectious disease surveillance is well accepted, 
surveillance of chronic diseases remains, in some cir-
cles, controversial.10 For example, New York city has 
drawn controversy with its diabetes surveillance pro-
gram, which includes mandatory laboratory report-
ing of glycated hemoglobin, directives for physicians 
in managing patients with poor glycemic control, and 
advice to patients about diabetes management. Civil 
libertarians and some physicians vehemently oppose 
surveillance, arguing it interferes with patient privacy, 
clinical freedom, and the doctor-patient relationship. 
Patients can opt out of receiving health department 
advice, but not the reporting requirement. How-
ever, opting out is a complex procedure, which itself 
requires limited information disclosure.11 
Monitoring of NCD rates is essential if governments 
are to be held accountable for health outcomes among 
their populations. A purely ‘opt-in’ scheme for sur-
veillance would run the risk of selection bias: if, for 
example, a given minority group is prone to opt-out, 
their rising NCD rates may go unnoticed. Moreover, 
as indicated, there is good reason to question the tra-
ditional outlook — seemingly at play in opposition to 
surveillance programs — which sees infectious dis-
eases as a proper concern of public health officials, but 
non-communicable diseases as falling within the priv-
ity of patient/doctor relationships. 
Full Disclosure of the Health Effects  
of Consumer Goods
Consumers often make poor product choices because 
they lack clear, comprehensible information. Consider 
the bewildering way in which much food is marketed: 
“low fat” can mask for high sugar and sodium, “low 
sodium” can mask for high calorie; “zero trans fats” 
can mask for high saturated fats; and so forth. 
To remedy this obfuscation, governments can com-
pel industry to disclose the truth about their products, 
by requiring clearer food package labeling, health 
warnings on cigarettes and alcohol, and nutritional 
information on restaurant menus. The United King-
dom Food Standards Agency developed a voluntary 
system that is visible and simple to follow. Known as a 
“traffic light” system, companies must label foods with 
prominent green, yellow, or red lights for each of the 
major nutritional groups — whole grains, saturated 
fat, sodium, and sugar.12 Not only does this clearly 
inform the lay public, but it also provides an incentive 
for food manufacturers to develop healthier products, 
to avoid the stigma of four prominent red lights on 
their packaging. Uniform labeling across brands may 
in turn promote healthy competition — in the most 
literal sense. Happily, clear and comprehensible food 
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labeling is entirely consonant with concerns for per-
sonal autonomy, as it merely enables individuals to 
make informed choices. 
Regulation of Advertisements
Many governments have already limited advertising 
of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, to forbid the tar-
geting of children and adolescents (though in virtually 
every country, more could be done, for example, on 
plain packaging of cigarettes). The notable exception 
is the food industry, which alone spends more than $11 
billion annually to market its products in the United 
States alone. The bulk of industry spending is to pro-
mote unhealthy foods, such as sweetened beverages, 
sugary cereals, candy, and highly processed foods with 
added sugar, fats, and sodium.13 Advertising is ubiqui-
tous, spanning television, radio, and the print media to 
the Internet and “advergames,” where food is used as 
a lure in fun video games.14 The industry has adopted 
ineffectual voluntary self-regulatory measures.15 
In 1980, Québec, Canada banned fast food adver-
tisements targeting children, which has reduced 
annual spending on fast foods by an estimated $88 
million. The province now boasts the country’s low-
est childhood obesity rate. Moreover, healthier eating 
habits, once ingrained in childhood, are carried into 
adult life.16
Regulating the content of advertising is conten-
tious, potentially implicating constitutional rights to 
commercial free speech. Certainly the public supports 
regulation of misleading messages directed toward 
young people, yet there is bound to be disagreement 
over what messages are misleading versus simply 
alluring. Despite these concerns, regulation of adver-
tising to children may be politically acceptable given 
the potential for manipulation of vulnerable youth 
and the state’s responsibility to protect minors. 
Setting Incentives and Disincentives
Government’s main method of disincentivizing the 
purchase of certain products is to levy taxes on them. 
So-called ‘fat-taxes’ have been proposed as a proactive 
response to a food industry and consumer culture that 
increasingly promotes unhealthy foods as the cheap-
est, tastiest, and most readily accessible option.17 
The World Health Organization has endorsed this 
strategy.18
As expected, critics allege that fat taxes are pater-
nalistic, and also regressive, as poor people are the 
primary consumers of high-fat foods. Again, it is 
instructive to contrast this to the regulation of ciga-
rettes, where there is greater support for state inter-
vention. One rarely hears it argued that cigarette taxes 
are paternalistic — not in serious debate, at least — 
as it is widely acknowledged that they serve merely 
to internalize the full social costs of smoking. On the 
‘regressive’ charge, notice that cigarette taxes are often 
praised as having a progressive health impact, pre-
cisely because the deterrent effect becomes stronger 
as one moves down the income scale.19 In the case of 
cigarettes there are valid concerns that heavy taxation 
may lead to smuggling and black market sales, partic-
ularly in the developing world;20 the Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control, discussed below, is meant 
partly to address this problem.21 
Unlike cigarettes — for which cessation is the best 
option — government can take steps to incentivize the 
production, sale and consumption of healthier foods, 
for example, by subsidizing fresh fruits and vegetables 
at the level of the farm or retailer. (In some leading 
food producing states, a first step would be to cease 
the subsidization of unhealthy foods, such as high 
fructose corn syrup or cane sugar). 
Furthermore, government, employers, and others 
could offer incentives for physical activity and exer-
cise: subsidies for taking public transportation, join-
ing fitness clubs, and participating in organized sport-
ing activities. Tax policy can be used, for example, to 
provide individuals a “flexible spending account” of 
tax-exempt funds for physical activities or exercise, 
such as riding a bicycle to work or school.
Direct Regulation
A more aggressive, and controversial, approach to 
regulation would consist of an outright ban on foods 
or ingredients deemed to be especially injurious to 
health. A growing body of scientific evidence links 
trans fatty acids to coronary heart disease. The Insti-
tute of Medicine concluded that trans fats provide 
no benefit to human health, and that there is no safe 
level of trans fat consumption.22 In 2003, Denmark 
became the first country to set an upper limit on the 
percentage of industrially produced trans fat in foods. 
New York City later restricted the sale of products 
containing artificial trans fat in all restaurants. As of 
July 1, 2007, restaurants were prohibited from pre-
paring recipes that contain more than 0.5 g of trans 
fat per serving.23 The Food and Drug Administration, 
moreover, requires trans fat levels to appear on food 
labels. Notice, however, that even 0.5 g of trans fat per 
serving is unhealthy, especially if a consumer is eating 
multiple servings during the course of a day. Recent 
studies have shown the New York ban to be a clear 
success — restaurants have lowered trans fat levels 
without raising prices or substituting a commensurate 
rise in saturated fats.24
Incremental forms of direct regulation have been 
proposed as ‘end game’ strategies in the war against 
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tobacco. Some propose gradually reducing the nico-
tine content of cigarettes, eventually dropping below 
the threshold levels of addiction.25 Others propose a 
‘sinking lid’ on the supply of cigarettes available for 
commercial sale,26 or grandfathering schemes that peg 
the age of sale to a calendar year — e.g., permanently 
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to anyone born after 
January 1, 2000.27 
Performance-Based Regulation
There is a concern that direct ‘command and control’ 
methods of regulation may have unforeseen negative 
consequences; the approach puts great stock in gov-
ernment’s ability to engineer healthy lifestyles. An 
alternative approach, which gets around this problem, 
is for government to set a measurable outcome, which 
companies must reach within a certain period of time, 
or face penalty.28 It is then left to relevant food com-
panies to figure out a way to meet these targets at pain 
of penalty if they fail. This approach harnesses the 
private sector’s capacity for innovation as an engine of 
public health. 
Optimize the Built Environment for Health
Individual choices are not made in isolation, but reflect 
in important ways the environment in which people 
live. The built environment may facilitate or inhibit a 
healthy lifestyle. Government’s job is to make health 
the easier, or default, choice rather than, at present, 
the much more difficult choice. Government can work 
to help people stay healthy by enacting zoning and 
land-use laws that create healthier places for its resi-
dents to live. By designing green spaces, playgrounds, 
sidewalks, and paths for easy walking, hiking, and bik-
ing, local government can do a great deal to improve 
the health of the population.
Government can also take steps to limit or dis-
courage motor vehicles in city centers, to encourage 
pedestrian traffic and make the air cleaner for walkers 
and bicyclists. Thus, supporting mass transit systems 
and ensuring safe routes for people to walk to school, 
work, and shops are an essential part of a healthy 
community. In this way, public health goals are closely 
aligned with goals of the environmental movement. 
Finally, governments could require that planning 
for new developments include health impact assess-
ments. Consultation with communities and public 
health evaluations could be required as a pre-condi-
tion of initiating significant building projects.
This survey of regulatory options available to 
domestic governments is necessarily cursory. Indi-
vidual countries and communities will need to choose 
among these and other options, developing strategies 
that address their needs. What we mean to impress 
is simply the breadth of options available to govern-
ments — hopefully giving readers some sense, by 
implication, of the limited role for courts. 
We next explore how governance structures at the 
international level could support national govern-
ments in their efforts to combat NCDs. The ques-
tion links to an innovative global civil society project 
recently launched, pressing for a Framework Conven-
tion on Global Health. 
3. Marshaling a Global Response
For a time, rising NCD rates were met with apathy 
from the global community. There is no global fund 
for chronic diseases, no major foundation champion-
ing the cause, little mention by the G8 or G20, and 
the issue is not even targeted in the UN’s Millen-
nium Development Goals. As discussed, the preemi-
nent global health institution, WHO, has historically 
focused its attention and resources on infectious dis-
eases — though that is changing, as we will explain. 
The complexity of NCDs presents a challenge in 
forging a unified and comprehensive global response. 
NCDs comprise a basket of various diseases, implicat-
ing risk factors that span multiple sectors of econo-
mies and societies. Furthermore, viable solutions will 
necessarily implicate not only public actors but also 
a host of private actors, including private companies, 
civil society, the media, and academia. We begin by 
explaining why a global response is needed, notwith-
standing these formidable challenges. 
Individual choices are not made in isolation, but reflect in important ways 
the environment in which people live. The built environment may facilitate 
or inhibit a healthy lifestyle. Government’s job is to make health the easier, 
or default, choice rather than, at present, the much more difficult choice. 
Government can work to help people stay healthy by enacting zoning and 
land-use laws that create healthier places for its residents to live.
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Why a Global Response Is Urgently Needed
Processes of globalization have led to a harmoniza-
tion of behaviors — exacerbating many of the risk 
factors for NCDs in the process.29 Thus, for example, 
the industrialization of food manufacture, along with 
the globalization of trade in food, has led to the dis-
placement of traditional diets, in favor of a dietary 
convergence around processed, high-sugar, high-salt, 
high-fat foods (HSSF foods).30 The health effects are 
exacerbated by urbanization, often linked to increased 
reliance on cars, polluted air, and fewer options for 
physical exercise. 
Globalization also shapes the power dynamics in 
health politics, as large multinationals exert their 
influence, resisting change at every turn. Over the 
past quarter century, transnational tobacco compa-
nies have aggressively exploited growth opportunities 
in developing countries.31 Internet commerce, online 
marketing and the illicit trade in tobacco products 
have greatly complicated attempts to regulate the sup-
ply and marketing of these products.32 A strong cor-
relation has been found between free trade liberaliza-
tion and increased consumption of tobacco.33
After tobacco use, alcohol consumption is the 
world’s third-largest risk factor for health burden; in 
middle-income countries, which constitute almost 
half of the world’s population, it in fact poses the 
greatest risk.34 The alcohol industry is as globalized as 
the tobacco industry — creating comparable problems 
for regulation at the national level.35 The industry also 
jealously defends its right to market its products, even 
portraying them as sexy, adventurous, and sporty. 
The food industry is more complex given that food 
is part of life’s necessities. But that industry too has 
ubiquitously marketed foods that are highly pro-
cessed, fat laden, sweetened, and full of sodium. 
Many lower income countries lack the resources 
needed to contain the risk factors associated with 
NCDs.36 Major multinationals promoting cigarettes, 
alcohol, and unhealthy foods may have resources at 
their disposal that far surpass the GDP of some of 
these countries. A global response is needed to ensure 
adequate resources, and to ensure that all countries 
have access to the necessary expertise.
The Political Declaration on NCDs
In recent years, WHO has begun to take initiative on 
the NCD pandemic, even if very late and too little. 
Arguably the most significant step was the adoption, in 
2003, of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol (FCTC),37 which provides a blueprint for national 
tobacco control policies, tying these to an evolving 
scheme of international protocols (e.g. controlling 
sales to minors, tobacco smuggling, and packaging 
guidelines). The FCTC was groundbreaking, being the 
first treaty negotiated under the auspices of the WHO. 
It is also one of the most widely embraced treaties in 
the history of the UN, having now 174 signatories. 
Other WHO initiatives — which due to space con-
straints we can only mention here — include the 
Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases (2000), the Global Strat-
egy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (2008); the 
Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alco-
hol (2010), and the formation of a Global Noncom-
municable Disease Network (NCDnet).38 The WHO is 
also formally linked to the Global Alliance for the Pre-
vention of Obesity and Related Chronic Diseases — a 
grouping a NGOs working to coordinate strategies on 
diet and excercise.39
These various WHO initiatives, while important, 
did not bring the issue of NCDs to the same high pro-
file as, for example, the global initiative around HIV/
AIDS. The global health community lobbied suc-
cessfully for a High-level Meeting (HLM) of the UN 
General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of 
NCDs, which was held in September 2011. Hopes 
were understandably high: prior to this, there had 
only been one such meeting with a health focus – a 
momentous 2001 meeting on AIDS, which galvanized 
social and political action on that pandemic. 
The HLM on NCDs resulted in the unanimous 
adoption of a Political Declaration on the Preven-
tion and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases — a 
65-point document, cataloguing many facets of the 
problem, and calling for a ‘whole-of-government’ 
and ‘whole-of-society’ response.40 Broadly speak-
ing, the Declaration calls for a range of preventative 
measures, strengthening national health systems to 
ensure early detection and treatment of NCDs; inter-
national cooperation on NCDs; research and develop-
ment; and monitoring and evaluation of progress on 
the issue. 
The Declaration, however, is short on specifics for 
implementation, calling on member states to develop 
their own national action plans by 2013, guided by 
voluntary targets subsequently issued by the WHO 
in 2012. In May of 2012, the World Health Assem-
bly — the voting body of WHO — gaveled through a 
resolution setting a global target of a 25% reduction 
in premature mortality from NCDs by 2025 (conve-
niently yielding a catchy slogan — “25 by 25”). Set-
ting very broad and distant targets in this way is the 
easy part, of course, as experience with climate change 
has shown; the hard part is establishing specific, 
near term targets, monitoring progress against clear 
benchmarks, and ensuring compliance. At the time 
of writing, member states were slated to meet by the 
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end of October 2012 to establish further targets and a 
monitoring framework. 
We emphasize that these are all voluntary, non-
binding targets — a feature which has been the focus 
of many critiques of the Declaration. UN Special Rap-
porteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, for 
example, promptly complained of a missed oppor-
tunity for firm action to end farm subsidies for non-
nutritious foods, or to curtail the marketing of junk 
food to children worldwide.41 Similar complaints have 
issued from advocacy groups working on other NCD 
risk factors. What was conspicuously absent from 
the Political Declaration were effective measures for 
global governance — either “soft” or “hard” — with the 
power to steer global health action on NCDs.
It is unfortunate that this important groundwork 
for global action on NCDs was laid during a severe 
economic downturn. Though the Declaration rec-
ognizes the need for resources, it makes no commit-
ments to provide them — instead calling on Member 
States to investigate funding options, within their 
budget allocations, and through ‘innovating financing 
mechanisms.’ The Declaration speaks as well of the 
importance of North-South cooperation, but takes no 
steps to set that in motion. 
Ambitious, long-term targets and catchy slogans 
can play an important role in consciousness raising — 
the campaign to eradicate smallpox worked to a target 
date, and more recently the ‘3 by 5’ slogan (three mil-
lion people on antiretroviral therapy by 2005) was an 
inspiring benchmark for the HIV/AIDS movement. 
However, the ‘25 by 25’ target is ambitious even by 
comparison to those lofty campaigns, and there is no 
agreement on intermediary benchmarks. 
The challenge grows more daunting by the day, as 
key risk factors of smoking, alcohol, unhealthy diet, 
and insufficient physical exercise are on the rise, as is 
the primary risk factor — aging. Moreover, there are 
limits on what can be achieved through preventative 
measures in the space of 13 years. A good portion of 
the target 25% reduction will need to be achieved 
through treatment rather than prevention — requir-
ing dramatic increases in funding, full engagement 
of pharmaceutical companies, low cost and effective 
diagnostics, and buy-in from ministries of finance, 
trade, customs, and transportations. In contrast, curb-
ing the NCD pandemic in the long run will require 
determined action to prevent the primary behavioral 
risk factors. 
The Political Declaration will hopefully not be the 
last global pronouncement on the matter. Other ambi-
tious ideas have been tabled for global health gover-
nance, some building on the framework convention 
model employed for tobacco control. For example, 
there is a growing campaign afoot for a Framework 
Convention on Global Health (FCGH), building on 
the precedent of the historic FCTC. The Joint Action 
and Learning Initiative on National and Global 
Responsibilities for Health (www.jalihealth.org) is 
leading this campaign, which aims to broadly reshape 
global governance for health — establishing binding 
national and international commitments on health, 
addressing many of the key risk factors for NCDs.42 
Borrowing from the FCTC or FCGH, advocates have 
called for a framework convention on alcohol and on 
obesity itself.
Challenges to a Global Response
The WHO, unlike any other global-health body, can 
create legally binding conventions, requiring a two-
thirds majority vote by member states. However, the 
WHO has generally preferred to issue non-binding 
recommendations, guidelines, and standards. Lack of 
political will has often stood in the way. An example is 
the attempt to adopt a binding regulation on the mar-
keting of breast-milk substitutes, dating back to the 
1970s, which failed thanks to opposition from some 
developed countries.43 
The WHO’s reluctance to use hard legal instruments 
has been lamented by some.44 Others argue that the 
direct costs associated with drafting, ratification, and 
enforcement of international laws — together with 
disadvantages of prioritizing process over outcomes, 
consensus over diversity, generality over specificity, 
states over non-state actors, and lawyers over health 
researchers — make the soft law approach a better 
option.45 
Most importantly, for any approach that is adopted 
there must be mechanisms to ensure compliance. This 
is true for both hard and soft law. The risks here are 
evidenced with the FCTC: despite this legally binding 
instrument, tobacco use is increasing in many poor 
countries, and remains the second-largest cause of 
disease risk in middle-income countries.46 
3. Multisectoral Approaches:  
Their Promise and Pitfalls
Our discussion to this point has advocated an ‘all-of-
government’ approach, encompassing a range of pol-
icy initiatives that fall outside the health portfolio as 
traditionally conceived — implicating trade, agricul-
ture, urban planning, schools, the environment, etc. 
We then explained that the support and collaboration 
of global institutions was needed, to ensure that health 
is prioritized amidst global forces pursuing trade and 
economic development. In this final section, we look 
beyond the role of national and international public 
institutions, to explore the role of private companies, 
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civil society, the media, and academia, in an ‘all-of-
society’ effort to reverse NCD rates. 
Engaging Private Industry 
One can scarcely overstate the power that multination-
als wield over the risk factors associated with NCDs, 
from the labeling and nutritional content of foods on 
grocery store shelves and in restaurants, to the global 
marketing of sugary drinks, alcoholic beverages, and 
cigarettes. If the pandemic is to be dealt with, private 
industry must play some role. It can be compellingly 
argued that the tobacco industry has no role to play 
as a partner in public health, as that industry will best 
contribute to public health by disappearing. The same 
cannot be said, though, of the food industry — nor, 
realistically, of the alcohol industry. 
The question is not so much whether private indus-
try will be engaged, but how. And public health agen-
cies — both domestic and global — must adopt clear 
conflict of interest rules that prevent industry from 
having preferential access to policymaking or undue 
influence. Various arrangements are possible, ranging 
from command-and-control approaches to public/
private partnerships, through to voluntary self-regu-
lation. No prescription can be issued in the abstract; a 
dynamic approach is needed, driven by the pursuit of 
the public’s health. We offer some pathways for con-
structive industry engagement. 
There are well-known risks involved in attempting 
to regulate well-entrenched private industries. Among 
these is the risk of regulatory ‘capture,’ whereby public 
agencies fall under the sway of industries under their 
charge. The theory here, roughly stated, is that sub-
jects of regulation have a high-stakes interest in influ-
encing their regulators, and will focus their energies 
and resources to sway policy in a favorable direction. 
Even if raw self-interest does not hold sway, regulators 
and industry work so closely with one another that 
they can get too cozy and comfortable. On the face of 
it, the risk of regulatory capture seems especially acute 
in efforts to address NCD risk factors. The food, alco-
hol, and cigarette industries are dominated by huge 
multinationals, with deep pockets and demonstrated 
lobbying savvy. As we’ve seen, the counterbalanc-
ing forces of social mobilization on this issue have, to 
date, been fragmented and ineffectual — due in part to 
inherent features of the NCD crisis (e.g., the diversity 
and complexity of ailments captured by this umbrella 
term). 
Problems akin to regulatory capture can arise 
whether private industry is regulated under a com-
mand-and-control model, or instead engaged in pub-
lic-private partnerships. As others have noted, the oft-
touted model of ‘public-private partnerships’ is poorly 
defined and multiply ambiguous. In some 
instances, the ostensible ‘partners’ are 
tied only financially, with the private sec-
tor funding government initiatives (or 
vice versa). In other cases, partnerships 
merely provide a forum for ‘discussion’ 
between public and private sectors, with 
no money changing hands, and no shared 
governance responsibilities. In other 
cases still, partnerships involve more for-
mal governance structures, with voting 
boards drawn from public and private 
sectors.47 And these partnerships can delay or even 
block what may be truly needed, which is direct reg-
ulation. One cannot assume that these partnerships 
are structured to serve the public interest; they must 
be carefully scrutinized to guard against conflicts of 
interest. 
There will often be no path of ‘enlightened self-
interest’ leading major multinationals to voluntarily 
sell healthier goods. The reality, as one author puts 
it, “is that ‘good’ foods are bad commodities with low 
profit margins while ‘bad’ foods are good commodi-
ties.”48 The public health community must brace itself 
for a long, uphill battle on this issue, and be very wary 
of ‘win-win’ solutions touted by industry. Ultimately, 
it must become unacceptable for industry to aggres-
sively market unhealthy products, enticing consum-
ers to eat food or drink beverages that are distinctly 
unhealthy. 
Civil Society Engagement
In its political dynamics, the issue of NCDs has a 
foreboding similarity to climate change: both involve 
urgent global challenges, requiring major investments 
of financial resources and political capital, whose divi-
dends will pay out long after the next election cycle. 
Under these circumstances there is a strong temp-
tation for those in positions of power — in govern-
ment and private industry — to leave the problem for 
another day. It therefore falls to civil society to be vocal 
and relentless on this issue, pressing governments to 
There will often be no path of ‘enlightened 
self-interest’ leading major multinationals to 
voluntarily sell healthier goods. The reality, as 
one author puts it, “is that ‘good’ foods are bad 
commodities with low profit margins while 
‘bad’ foods are good commodities.”
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set out detailed strategies, with near-term bench-
marks and monitoring requirements. 
Here too, one must demand transparency from civil 
society groups, and be watchful for potential conflicts 
of interest. As with every dirty trick in health politics, 
this one has been performed par excellence by the 
tobacco industry, which for decades disseminated 
misinformation about the health risks and addictive-
ness of cigarettes, through front groups masquerading 
as independent think tanks.49 
Broader consciousness-raising about NCDs will be 
vital as well — pitched at the general public qua citi-
zens and consumers. In the current climate of world-
wide government austerity, it will no doubt be argued 
that the problem is too costly to address now; this atti-
tude dovetails ideologically with the view that NCD 
prevention is a matter of personal rather than public 
responsibility. Public initiatives to address the tobacco 
and HIV/AIDS epidemics were stalled for a time, with 
enormous human costs, thanks to misguided beliefs 
along these same lines. The point needs to be driven 
home relentlessly that government can respond effec-
tively to the NCD crisis, and that failure to do so will 
be many times more costly. 
Having secured a place for NCDs on the public 
agenda, civil society will then have an ongoing role 
to play, lending its expertise to the development and 
selection of evidence-based policy responses.50 As the 
survey of policy options above suggests, expert input 
from very diverse sources will be required (e.g., experts 
in urban planning, agriculture policy, and information 
sciences). 
Through all of this, global cooperation among civil 
society groups will be essential. The coming years will 
hopefully see experimentation with novel strategies to 
reverse NCD rates, offering an opportunity for coun-
tries to learn from one another’s successes and fail-
ures. Civil society groups will have an important role 
to play in this learning process, as impartial observers 
committed to advancing public health.
Why the Crushing and Unequal Burden  
of NCDs Is Unacceptable
It seems paradoxical, on its face: the major health 
challenges of our time desperately call out for national 
and global action on an unprecedented scale; yet the 
trend in many countries is toward litigation of health 
rights, often on an individualized basis. On reflec-
tion, though, it appears that these two trends may be 
mutually supporting. Our failure to take meaningful, 
collective action to reverse rising NCD rates has left 
health systems worldwide to cope with the burden. As 
those systems reach their resource capacity, there is no 
choice but to ration care. The end result: worldwide, 
vast numbers of very sick people coping with chronic 
illnesses, scrabbling for expensive treatments; those 
who can appeal to the courts as a last resort. 
The NCD crisis is largely of our own making — 
reflecting individual and societal choices — and can 
be reversed only through concerted national and 
global effort. The past century has seen inspiring 
achievements in public health, though perhaps none 
has required such a broad, multi-sectoral response as 
reversing the dominant trend of ever increasing obe-
sity, sedentary lifestyles, and self-destructive behavior 
through tobacco use and excessive consumption of 
alcoholic beverages.
For those who argue that all this suffering and eco-
nomic toll is only a matter of personal choice, family 
responsibility, and the free market, we insist that the 
status quo is simply unacceptable. Make health the 
easier, default, option, rather than being agonizingly 
difficult.51 Reveal the suffering of people, families, 
and whole societies caused by the crushing burden of 
NCDs. And refuse to accept the unconscionable health 
inequalities between the rich and poor — both within 
and among nations. 
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